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HENNING SALLING OLESEN
11. CULTURAL IDENTITY, LEARNING AND SOCIAL 
PREJUDICE
The Politicization of Subjectivity in Former Yugoslavia
worked regularly at annual workshops in Dubrovnik, gradually developing a practice 
of deep-hermeneutic interpretation. The main ambition of the methodology is to 
track the societally unconscious subjective dynamics in different areas of everyday 
life by means of psychodynamic analysis applied on everyday life interaction. 
However, for work in this location, the experience of the war that followed in the 
wake of Yugoslavia’s dissolution formed an overwhelmingly strong and an inevitable 
challenge for understanding the social psychology of those relatively abstract national 
and religious identities and differences that are the drivers in identity-based politics. 
So for this case the research group has departed from its usual terrain working to 
interpret the dynamics of the conflicts several times. Unlike the rest of our activity 
we have worked on the basis of secondary accounts and reports, which are however 
also abundant. This chapter will present some of the reflections on this work.
At the time, around the millennium, the extreme events in the conflict seemed 
predominantly pathological in the sense that they seemed entirely disconnected from 
could extremism and endless cruelty happen in a modern civilized part of Europe? 
It became in itself a challenge to our interdisciplinary group of people from social 
and humanistic sciences to be able to understand the connections between ordinary 
people’s everyday life and their readiness to take part in a civil war in the name 
of national (ethnic) and religious identity, and in many cases be direct actors in 
atrocities against former neighbours and members of the local community.
mediated through the (individual) subjective process of socialization, consciousness 
building and action. We wanted not only to understand which mechanisms 
empowered political leaders and were utilized by them in the deliberate attempts 
to politicize subjectivity, but also their ‘background’ processes of societal change 
and cultural development. We wished to investigate how subjective processes are 
part of social interaction, being the object of historical circumstances, while they 
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themselves provide fuel for political processes in one direction or another – which is 
a matter of political psychology.
We did also find interesting theoretical inspiration in psychoanalytically informed 
research of cultural identities that addressed these types of issues, and our aim was 
to situate these ‘mechanisms’ in a historical context of societal development and 
cultural encounters. One of the first central inspirations was V. Volkan’s concept of 
group, and people act individually on behalf of the large group. While distancing 
himself from an individual psychological explanation of the significance of the 
group, e.g. in the form of a father figure or a motherly agency for caring, Volkan 
especially focuses on the significance of the large group identity for social relations 
within the group and for the engagement of group members in conflicts with other 
groups (Volkan, 2001, 2009). Volkan himself has a life history association with 
a nationality conflict, being born in the Turkish minority in Cyprus. He is now a 
prominent psychiatrist in the US, and has engaged in a number of initiatives for 
conflict resolution and dialogue between implacable groups around the world. His 
theory is in general that the belonging to a particular group, e.g. a nation, will remain 
a lifelong constitutive element in individual identity, while other elements of identity 
are added during the life course. He understands the constitution and significance 
of this group identity within the thinking of object relations theory. Within this 
conceptual framework, conflict behaviour of large groups is described as a reaction 
which defends group members or the group as such against humiliations or threats. 
This conflict behaviour is reparative, it is about defending the very identity, including 
its recognizable separation from other group identities. Volkan connects conflict 
behaviour with the psychodynamic level via the theory of socialization: while the 
child gradually develops tolerance of ambivalence, it will integrate some of the 
externalizations, or splittings, that characterize early childhood, but this integration 
will never be complete. The incompletely integrated elements then remain in the 
individual psyche as potential material for defensive reactions, and Volkan argues 
that group identification is psychodynamically based on these elements. Violations 
of the identity of the group or mere threats against it activate unconscious dynamics 
which shape particular current perceptions and reactions in a way which can only 
be understood as feelings of a general threat and a defence of the identity as such.
This context of understanding identity and culture has interesting implications for 
theoretical discussion, e.g. in sociological theory, and for ‘contemporary diagnosis’: 
What are the specifics of our contemporary society, where are we heading? In this 
discussion, the increasing significance of subjective orientations seems to be one of 
the few consensual aspects. Such a ‘holistic’ theoretical approach to the links between 
subjectivity and social action cuts across research topics such as peace and conflict, 
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political reorientations in a post-nation state setting, lifelong learning, migration and 
cultural integration, change processes in communities and organizations, which are 
all also interrelated fields. However, this approach is important for understanding 
identity as an emotional dynamics which organizes feelings, relations and 
consciousness; it may encompass aspects of learning as well as defensive rejections 
of certain insights and experiences, i.e. an ongoing process of identification(s).
In my own research, this concept of identity is empirically grounded in studies 
of the subjective aspects of wage labour and (un)employment and the subjective 
handling of changes in working life, which reveal crucial identity processes in 
everyday life (Salling Olesen, 2001, 2007; Salling Olesen & Weber, 2001). Work 
identity and professional identities inform and reflect the subjective meaning of work 
and of specific professional roles and practices. The study of identification processes 
offers fundamental contributions to the theory of learning. In this context, I also see 
the opposite possibility: a theory of learning (and resistance to learning) may help us 
the politicization of identity. Although different contexts and domains obviously 
have a different subjective status, I think this indicates the sense in connecting 
(comparing) the examination of those challenges to everyday life practice, which 
may or may not elicit epistemic processes and social experiences to form the basis 
of identity building and sudden strong new identifications – in extreme cases leading 
to hostility to others and violence.
In my learning theory framework identity appears as a product of and also an 
active element in the subjective process of experience building (Salling Olesen, 
than a stable coherence of self and social practices, once and for all established 
through socialization, and inscribed in a stable cultural framework, ‘identity’ refers 
to a temporary relationship between individual experience and social practices 
in which the individual is engaging, while learning is an intended or unintended 
and unrecognized dimension of this experiential process. At any one time, this 
relationship may provide a more or less contradictory framework for dealing with 
new challenges and knowledge and relating new practices to habitual ones. This 
identity is generally a dynamic and contradictory relationship because conditions are 
contradictory, as are the subjective driving forces.
Intercultural relations and cultural exchanges always challenge identity. In the 
best case, this implies learning and development for each party involved. But not 
necessarily. A fundamental point of departure is that everyday life experience 
is located in a field of tension between potentials for learning and the inclination 
towards defence. Intercultural relations occurring in this everyday life are interpreted 
within the consciousness building rooted in everyday life, and very often this means 
integrating them in patterns of recognition and routine which do not affect the 
consciousness of everyday life, which in itself is an active form of defence. The 
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production of a stereotypical consciousness as a (collective) defensive reaction 
to handle overwhelming demands as well as life historical anxieties in everyday 
life. Automatic assumptions about unknown phenomena to which one relates by 
coincidence or through external circumstances occur all the time in everyday life. 
However, sometimes they engage more emotional energy and become a cognitively 
defined idea, a fixed orientation in relation to strangers and unknown realities. 
When it results in inability to recognize people or phenomena in a differentiated and 
The psychodynamic theory may help to understand the origins of social prejudice. 
The production and emotional charging and strengthening of specific cognitive 
patterns and ideas may be interpreted as a collective defensive action in order to 
handle the fragility and emotional burden of social life. The conception of the large 
group identity as a combination of a strong identification with one’s own group and 
the application of specific attributes and intentions to a hostile picture of another 
group makes it understandable that this identification may solve problematic and 
challenging aspects in one’s own identity process. The need for such a defence may 
have many reasons, combining social ruptures and contradictions and life historical 
subjective experiences. But focusing on the active nature of this mechanism 
also points out that there is an alternative way of handling these experiences and 
conditions which depends on alternative identifications – and the claim here is that 
this is the social psychology core of the political process. In this way of conceiving 
identity and identification, the fundamental alternative is between learning, i.e. 
understanding not only social reality but also your own subjectivity, and meeting 
challenges through the production of social prejudice.
The power of identity politics depends on the ability to mobilize socially and 
collectively irritations and unresolved conflicts on different levels within an 
identification and possible social practice. A critical study of the subjectivity 
of cultural conflicts should examine the interrelations between experiences and 
conflicts between a level of individual life history and emotionality, a level of 
everyday social practice and moral orientation, and a societal/political level, Only 
by uncovering the channels of dislocating energies between these levels can we seek 
to distinguish between the manipulative use of identity politics and legitimate claims 
of recognition (Fukuyama, 2018).
The dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the very complex and rapid development 
of violent conflicts and hostilities is a thought-provoking exposition of the new 
relevance of the theme of interculturality. In a short span of time, we experienced 
dramatic (re)construction of cultural and political identities, largely defining 
themselves in opposition to each other. This did not happen spontaneously. There 
is hardly any doubt that this process was driven forward and the contradictions 
deliberately nurtured by some of the political forces in the region, and a political 
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science analysis might stop at examining these political forces and the interests behind 
them. This aspect involves important international geo-politics which I will leave 
aside here, and also socio-structural factors that I will partly return to. But the focus 
here will be on understanding the social and cultural circumstances and the level of 
everyday life which produced and enabled this political process and also developed 
a new political reality. Here we are not only interested in the identifications which 
atrocities committed in the name of cultural identity (ethnicity, religion), the killing of 
neighbours and ethnic cleansings, call strongly for all possible attempts to understand 
out of complex life experiences. This seems to be an important adjustment to the 
ways of understanding and evaluating the process which appear in national(ist) 
history writing (itself one of the collective identity productions) as well as to the 
rationalistic manner of the ‘international community’ which finally condemns but 
basically does not care to understand the dynamics. We want to understand the 
conflicts in endogenous concepts, as a complex of historical rationalities and emotions 
that have been dislocated, partly deliberately, partly by the difficulty of most actors 
in understanding themselves and their own feelings. Democracy, tolerance and 
humanity depend on a better understanding of what happened: a practical piece of 
reconciliation, of ‘never again …’.
The political history of the Balkans is complicated but a broad overview of the 
cultural and social elements involved is necessary for understanding the identity 
politics. Yugoslavia was rather artificially constructed as a unified kingdom after 
World War I, composed of bits and pieces from the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(Croatia, Slovenia and parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina) and the existing kingdoms 
of Serbia and Montenegro. These kingdoms were not very old but had been under 
Ottoman rule, Bosnia as a genuine part and the others paying tribute. In spite of the 
absence or fragility of nation states, these affiliations have had some implications. 
The Austro-Hungarian parts seem to have been influenced by industrialization and 
and Montenegro were orthodox, whereas Bosnia was Muslim. The population was 
ethnically heterogeneous and there were various mixed regions. Beside Muslims, 
there were both Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, Slavonia around the Danube was a 
total mix of Serbs and Croats, Vojvodina was mainly inhabited by Hungarians, and 
Krajina in Croatia was inhabited by Serbian peasants who had been given a piece of 
land as a reward for their participation in the war against the Ottomans.
World War II activated many of the differences and contradictions in this 
patchwork country. But the successful resistance to the Nazi-German invasion 
established a new political leadership centred on the communist partisan movement. 
allying with the Axis powers. The base of the partisan movement went across ethnic, 
religious and other divides, and after the war a federal republic was established with 
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the intent of eradicating the many divisions by merging and bridging between the 
nations and religions, while also recognizing the problems involved, as can be seen 
new Yugoslav national ideology emerged, later called Titoism because it projected 
this intention on the former partisan leader, later president, Marshall Tito. With the 
successful rejection of Stalinist domination from 1953, a leading role in the group 
of non-aligned countries, and an industrial development attempting to create a 
grew into a powerful unifying symbol both domestically and internationally. The 
economy was originally a typical state-directed command economy, but after the 
break with the Soviet Union a model combining market economy and socialist self-
management was launched and formalized in a party decision in 1964. This gave a 
new momentum for the idea of Yugoslavia as a third way in the environment of cold 
war and systems competition, and both the economic and cultural modernization 
distinguished the country from the rest of the socialist world. During the process 
of modernization, free migration took place; the mixing of peoples accelerated 
and ethnic differences seemed to lose their importance. In Bosnia, which had the 
most mixed population, 25% of all marriages in the 80s were of mixed ethnicity. 
The public culture was generally secular. People were not very religious, neither in 
terms of beliefs nor practice. International influence on communications, culture and 
consumption was very strong. One never heard any significant reference to ethnicity, 
except as a historical element of regional origin within the nation state. Serbo-Croat 
was, until the late 80s, seen as one language, though written in two alphabets. 
However, the country also remained very heterogeneous, with strong regional 
differences in development, and as the authority of the partisan movement from the 
war faded away, it became more difficult for the communist party to maintain control. 
In everyday life there was an ambivalent relationship to the communist party and to 
centralism, which also included the usual resignation in socialist countries regarding 
hidden usurpation by the elite and the party. After a period of increasing wealth 
stimulated by loans, foreign debt was a heavy burden, and the ability of the regime 
to recover after Tito’s death was low (Potts, 1996). In spite of ambitious attempts 
to create a new model of socialist self-management, the traditional party-controlled 
power structure also remained dominant. Nationalism was repressed, especially 
royalism, but also ordinary democratic criticism was added to potential enemies of 
identification increasingly seemed to be ‘the old system’ and ‘the identity of the 
former generation’, de-legitimizing the regime and the federal state.
It seems clear that the unity of Yugoslavia was already being discussed in Croatia 
and Slovenia, by e.g. liberals, reform-oriented communists, technocrats of the well-
developed industry, and of course by the right-wing nationalists. In 1970/1971 there 
was an uprising in Croatia which played out as a national resistance against Serbian 
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dominance. It was silenced by traditional repression. A dramatic shift took place 
in the late 80s. After Tito’s death, critical voices seemed to be heard more openly, 
while at the same time the economy was worsening, inflation was accelerating, and 
the wish to leave Yugoslavia was growing in Slovenia and Croatia. A convergence 
between demands for democracy, liberation of the most competitive parts of 
business, and Croatian nationalism was challenging the regime and also the unity 
of the state. Nationalism started to flourish openly. The demand for democratization 
and modernization was converted into a demand for national independence in 
great speech in 1989 in Kosovo Polje, which he declared to be core homeland of the 
Serbs. He shifted the focus of identification of the regime from its socialist history 
from partisans to modernized self-management, over to a Serbian leadership with a 
history dating back to the battle against the Ottomans. This was the trigger for the 
emerging nationalist will to dissolve Yugoslavia to come out into the open.
Before that, the regime had already met Albanian demands for minority rights by 
the inclusion of the province of Kosovo in the Serbian state, violating the constitution 
national rights in the institutional arrangement, but a specific regional autonomy). 
the Serbs in the defence of the Slavs against the Ottomans indicated the end of Titoist 
nationalist key to justify Serbian rule in Kosovo, but he triggered off a nationalist 
wave in both Serbia and Croatia. The right wing in Croatia openly harassed people 
of Serbian origin in the republic of Croatia, and also campaigned against the ‘left 
wing’. A new paramilitary republican police force in Croatia soon started to develop 
into an army parallel to the federal army, with weapons imported with the financial 
support of Croatian diaspora. In Serbia paramilitary militias were established, partly 
on the basis of Chetnik groups, partly by nationalist political leaders who recruited 
of harassment, anxiety, preventive violence, and later ethnic cleansing started to 
work on local levels in the minority communities in Krajina and Slavonia, later in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo – but probably never really in the country as a 
whole (see e.g. Liversage, 1996; Vulliamy, 1994). People who had been friendly 
neighbours lived in fear of attack or even killed each other in the name of ethnicity 
and religion.
The political mechanism rests on the combination of strong identification (Croats 
seem today to be very Catholic, they go to church and confess) and the construction 
of complementary social prejudices about the other nations (‘The Serbs are lazy 
These prejudices were justified by historical legacy: all the hatred was allegedly 
there from ancient times, and was never really reconciled. All the nationalist forces 
and mutual prejudices had been controlled by Tito and when he passed away they 
surfaced again. Suddenly everybody seemed to assume that the modernization of 
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the country had taken place without really influencing fundamental identities and 
without any ‘civilizing’ effect.
This historical explanation seems to be a reduction, which is itself part of the 
construction of prejudices. On the one hand, it makes sense to describe the political 
process and warfare in terms of a regression to conflicts and identities from before 
World War II, and also to describe Titoism in terms of a temporary, idealized 
construction which was bound to fade one day. But it seems unlikely that the 
intermediate process which relativized the ethnic and religious differences did not 
leave any effects. Besides the identity construction emerging from a collective war 
heroism, Yugoslavia, unlike the east European communist countries, went through a 
social and cultural modernization process which was similar to the rest of (southern) 
Europe. In spite of the authoritarian political structures, there was a demand within 
the communist party which urged for democratization of the political system during 
the 70s and 80s, more or less in line with liberal critics of the regime outside the 
party. There was the attempt to design a new version of socialism with worker 
self-management and market economy, and experiments with direct democracy in 
Alegre and elsewhere, but still important. Yet the nationalist forces prevailed. 
Later in the conflict, external European policy obviously accepted the nationalist 
agenda of division; Germany promised recognition of Croatian independence 
without minority guarantees, followed by the EU, and a coalition of the regime and 
more or less criminal interests took over and accelerated the process, and as the 
conflicts developed it was a self-fuelling mechanism (war psychology). In general 
the identity politics, defining identity by ethnic, religious and national adherence, 
legitimized violence and built up social prejudices in an environment which was 
by and large in a modernization process, but also in a very fragile social situation. 
identity policies in the first place became the dynamics of the process: What are 
the emotional sources of social prejudice and identity politics? Could it possibly 
psychosocietal approach.
In the mutual escalation of the Yugoslavian conflict in the second half of the 1980s, 
nationalist discourses played an increasing role, especially in Croatia and Serbia. In 
Croatia, this had been a political factor in the post-war period. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, there was a strong call for independence in Croatia, which included 
left-wing criticism of the communist regime, democratic voices looking to the 
west and downright nationalist right-wing forces. Without neglecting this, it seems 
particularly interesting to investigate the Serbian identity dynamics in the 1980s. 
Volkan has contributed an incisive analysis of this (Volkan, 2001). In the following, 
I will discuss this analysis with the twofold interest of developing some aspects of 
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it, and of elaborating on the relation between psychodynamic and societal/historical 
perspectives.
Volkan has analysed the development of the Yugoslavian conflict and particularly 
Serbian nationalism, within his framework of large group identity (Volkan, 2001). 
Large group identity is activated when the group as such or group members are 
exposed to a violation or a threat; this situation is likely to produce a collective 
defensive reaction similar to splitting, in the form of prejudiced imaginations about 
other large groups and a reinforced identification with one’s own group. Volkan 
applies this analysis to Serbian references to the famous battle of Kosovo Polje on 
28 June 1389. The real history was that Serbs (and several other people from Bosnia, 
defeated, but they were able to delay the consecutive surrender of Serbian kingdoms 
to the Ottomans. This battle is a myth in Serbian history, and the date of the battle (28 
June) has been the occasion of the staging of significant later events: a secret treaty 
in 1876 with the Austro-Hungarian Empire about fighting the Ottomans, and more 
spectacularly, the assassination of Prince Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. Volkan 
argues that this myth in fact rearranges historical facts; the real battle and the heroic 
deeds which are celebrated were separated from the real surrender of Serbia under 
the Ottomans by some forty years. However, precisely the fact that they have been 
integrated into the construction of the myth colours our understanding of the social 
function of the myth: it epitomizes a Serbian self-understanding of being the real 
defenders of Christianity against Muslims and also the identity of being the heroic 
He argues that this trauma has been celebrated and told and trans-generationally 
reproduced over centuries, strengthening the large group identification of Serbs.
In the recent conflict it was deliberately used in the nurturing of Serbian 
of the nominated date of this battle, 28.06.1989. At this time the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was lurking, and the federal leadership had already, contrary to the 
constitution, included Vojvodina and Kosovo in the federal state of Serbia. In 
Kosovo the conflict was between the majority of ethnic Albanians and a Serbian 
minority, and Milosevic’s message was clear: he pronounced Kosovo the heartland 
of Serbia with reference to the battle 600 years ago, and he spoke (for the first time 
I think) of using armed force to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia. This speech was 
highly relevant to the development of the conflict. In Croatia and Slovenia, it was 
perceived as a direct claim for the leadership in the name of Serbian nationalism 
rather than the communist party, the partisan movement, etc., as institutionalized in 
the federal state, and it pushed the desire for independence/separation forwards in 
The nationalist agenda was not entirely new, and there could of course be rational 
republic. Yugoslavia was in deep economic crisis, the legitimacy of the communist 
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of a connection between Muslim Bosnians and Turks/Muslims which recalled the 
historical colonization of the Slavic peoples by the Ottoman Empire. This narrative 
was being spread in many forms, feeding anxiety and aggression, suggesting but not 
stating explicitly (and thus open to debate) that a new contemporary conflict was 
approaching. In Volkan’s analysis, the main way of appealing to Serbian large group 
identity was the reference to the historical war against the Ottomans and the battle 
of mythology on a semantic level (Barthes, 1957), in this case obviously activating 
unconscious identifications and projections.
party conference in Kosovo in 1987, where the conflict between the Albanian majority 
and the Serbian minority had come to a head, describing his reaction as a kind of 
clad in the ‘armor’
in the form of a nationalist policy. This can be seen in line with Volkan’s more 
general analysis of the dialectic between the identification of members with the large 
group and the constraints it places on the leadership. Volkan has a long record of 
assisting in difficult arbitrations in fixed conflicts around the world, and he sees how 
the psychological carriage castle lays constraints on leaders who are forced to or are 
seeking to reach a liveable handling of hostile relations between two different large 
groups (Volkan, 2009). One might say that he implicitly applies a perspective of 
political leadership that may seek to mobilize the large group identity as a political 
of being a child of a dysfunctional family may well be correct, but it seems reasonable 
the power of the myth, and thereby the chance to shift his political base into Serbian 
nationalism. By activating the myth of the trauma from 1389 he ignites a fire, but the 
fuel for this fire is contemporary and societal.
If we see the trauma not as caused by the historical events and simply historically 
remembered, but as a reproduction of meaning in identity processes over centuries, 
we must seek to understand not only the psychodynamic mechanism of defensive 
that have been subjectively mediated in it at any time in this transmission, including 
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the contemporary context. There is no doubt that Serbian nationalism also existed 
as an undercurrent in Serbian society in the days of Titoism, and this could be 
new political range, and so far his individual conviction is important. But from a 
damburst, where national and religious identification could become all-pervasive. 
What were the societal circumstances that enabled the shift? And especially: What 
were the subjective experiences of these societal factors in the broad masses of the 
people to which he gave a political direction? And of course at the end of the day: 
Could they have been interpreted differently, leading to more a peaceful handling of 
the societal difficulties and the divisions in the population?
Why is the understanding of the subjective dynamics of ordinary people important? 
Because, on the one hand, it provides an understanding of the conditions for the 
social prejudices that the manipulative leader can work with. But also because the 
potential for alternatives to the development of social prejudices must reside in the 
same subjective experience.
I shall attempt a modest approach to some of the historical circumstances that may 
have been involved in some of the most emotional and extreme aspects of the identity 
politics, related with gender and sexuality.
The history of the western Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries is, like that of 
many other European regions, a history of people tossed around by empires and 
attempts to construct or reconstruct states on the battlefield. The conglomerate state 
of the southern Slavs was born to accommodate many historical identities and it may 
seem plausible that the history of Yugoslavia is about the success and failure of this 
construction. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was implemented as a (re)construction 
of national and religious identities that allegedly had a background in history. 
Similarly to the Serbian identification with the chosen trauma, Croatian national 
history is claimed with reference to a short period of the Middle Ages when the area 
coat of arms is now part of the national flag. And this identification does not even 
have the same continuity as the Serbian one.
But the history of Yugoslavia is also a history of uneven European modernization. 
In spite of being a divided periphery and tossed around by the empires which 
contributed large numbers of poverty migrants worldwide, these countries also 
icon, was a precursor in atomic theory at a time when Croatia did not exist as a 
nation state, and Nicola Tesla, who competed with Edison concerning the electricity 
system in the USA (and won: AC became the dominant form of power network), 
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was born in the Serbian community under Austrian rule in the region that became 
later a controversial Serbian minority in Croatia. It seems that the Slavic part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire has to some extent been the experimental scene for 
early industrialization, whereas those regions that were under Ottoman rule until the 
Balkan wars in the early 20th century were left in peace as long as they paid tribute 
to the Sultan, and hence remained less affected by modernization.
The socialist republic established after World War II was part of the Eastern 
bloc in the first phase, but broke the bonds with Stalin even before the cold war 
divisions became all-pervasive. It was created on the basis of the communist partisan 
movement across all the divisions of ethnicity and religion, and the multicultural 
heterogeneity was carefully balanced in the institutional structure, respecting most 
ethnicities, religions, nationalities and languages. The historical remnants of the 
different past within the two empires left a certain difference between the northern 
and southern parts of the country, but the federal republic secured financing from the 
more wealthy parts of the country in the form of investments in the southern regions. 
Especially after the break with the Soviet Union, the new Yugoslavia underwent a 
modernization process, based on industrialization, a liberal market economy and 
western cultural influence. The ethnic and religious differences seemed to fade 
and were overshadowed by differences between industrialized urban and rural 
agricultural communities. This rapid modernization was similar to elsewhere in 
Europe and the communist power monopoly was hardly more totalitarian than the 
regimes in several southern European countries. Nevertheless, when confidence in 
a progressive unified Yugoslav state crumbled, it elicited national (and religious) 
identifications. We have seen similar situations where identifications with more 
or less real historical past events have become drivers of political processes, and 
this fits well with the theory of large group identity presented by V. Volkan: in 
crises, belonging to a large group produces stronger identification and reinforced 
delimitation and hostility with regard to others. The obvious political translation 
of this collective defence mechanism is the idea of ethnic cleansing and separation 
of people based on which large group they belong to. This mechanism remains 
active even at a relatively low level of conflict; recently attempts to finally settle the 
separation of Kosovo from Serbia are taking place as a negotiation about exchanging 
two regions so that each nation can get its nationals inside its own state, i.e. negotiated 
ethnic cleansing. There is probably an automatic vicious circle in a conflict: much 
of the mutual and accelerating ethnic violence can be seen as reactions to actual 
experiences of violence once the theme has been played out, or based in more or less 
war was driven by a particular aggression, especially in Bosnia, an aspect of specific 
cruelty which pursued the annihilation of the other population, cf. the massacre in 
Srebrenica. Obviously it was rooted in very fundamental feelings, such as anxiety 
and a feeling of potential annihilation if action is not taken.
But which contemporary experiences make these events comprehensible? It 
seems that a focus on gender can be a key to understanding some of the emotional 
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dimensions of the forms of conflict. Especially in Bosnia, but also in the rest of the 
conflict, there were many sexual violations, including sexual humiliation of both 
women and men of the other side, systematic rape, and a deliberate aim at ‘ethnic 
warfare’ by making women pregnant. These phenomena go far beyond the level of 
all ‘ordinary’ war psychology phenomena of drunken and undisciplined soldiers in a 
civil, undeclared and lawless war, which is of course the general context. According to 
there was a direct reference in Serbian propaganda to the reproductive capacity of the 
Bosnian Muslims – a rhetoric known from campaigns preceding genocide elsewhere 
but also from the general demonization of immigrant groups today.
To understand these phenomena it is especially interesting to bring in a historical 
context of masculine identity. On the one hand, some of the ideas of national and 
ethnic identity are closely related with masculine forms of identity building even in 
times of peace, most obviously in the Serbian nationalism of Chetniks, who identified 
themselves as soldiers or fighters. These groups formed and probably dominated the 
Serbian militias. But one might also see a masculinity identity of an agrarian society 
in the territorial forms of domination inherited in ethnic cleansing.
On the other hand, some of the forms of conflict have very clear sexual aspects 
of domination (in extreme cases, in systematic rapes and ideas about bio-warfare). 
It seems obvious to see these phenomena as indicators of a threatened masculinity 
which was not only reserved for subcultural social outcasts, and not only a 
process which undermines such traditional male roles.
With modernization, masculine identities go through a fundamental change. The 
detachment from means of production and the location (the land), internalization 
of the abstraction of time and instrumental action, wage labour as the form of 
social reproduction, etc. have to be learned, and have been learned with capitalist 
modernization (Vester, 1974; Willis, 1977). This process also took place in Yugoslavia, 
in a rapid development, but in different contexts – in some regions, especially in 
the south, the development was extremely uneven between industrial plants and 
cities, and backward agriculture. New gender relations also evolved, such as women 
entering the labour market, and the cultural gender relations rapidly modernizing, 
by adopting the role as breadwinner and wage labour – but when economic decline 
more broadly deprives people of this vision of a future, then it hits back. In this sense 
the modernization process may have paved the way for the regressive reaction to the 
economic and social decline. National identification and the accompanying social 
prejudices render legitimacy to a regressive masculinity, and maybe to a restauration 
of masculine identity as a ‘solution’ to many other identity problems, which had not 
been well accommodated in the previous years.
Many young men migrated to Germany, Scandinavia and elsewhere, and those 
who stayed were vulnerable. It seems as if the social base for Serbian militant 
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nationalism is an extremely regressive masculine culture, which found pride in 
the old Chetnik warrior traditions. This type of potentially violent masculinity was 
activated and legitimized, first in supporting their fellow Serbs in Krajina, then 
intervening in/creating a civil war in Slavonia and finally in escalating the violence 
in Bosnia (and later also in Kosovo). In a division of labour which the Federal 
Army – also dominated by Serbian officers, but for some time defending the federal 
state and maybe also faithful to the Titoist constitution – the militias performed the 
illegal and aggressive work that the army would not (openly) take. The militias, 
which were nothing but criminal gangs and frustrated but armed young men, played 
a significant role in creating anxiety and defining conflicts as nationalist conflicts.
Serbian nationalism has a certain mix of this archaic warrior culture and a peasant 
culture, which had a strong tradition of self-defence in relation to the Ottoman 
Empire, fostering a warrior ideology, which in its core is a territorial defensive 
ideology. But in this situation it became the spark that ignited the flames. I believe 
that the ethnic Serbs in Krajina were from the beginning just anxious about their 
situation in a possibly independent Croatia, because they already saw the nationalist 
nature of this new state. At the time of detaching Krajina within Croatia, all within 
Croatia was strong and visible. In this situation the Serbs regressed into territorial 
self-defence, easily recognized as peasants defending their land. But they then 
received more aggressive support from Serbian militia groups. The mechanism of 
large group identification explains how self-defence is converted into more active 
and aggressive agency by people who had previously been peaceful citizens.
I consider that the right wing in Croatia could, though a little more subtly, also be 
seen as a specific regression in gender relations: the restauration of authoritarianism 
went hand in hand with the strong confessional turn to Catholicism and the diaspora 
building national armed forces. I think the fuel of these cultural shifts could also be 
understood in the context of a blocked development of the wage labour masculinity; 
an economic crisis and unemployment found a satisfactory explanation in the idea 
that the (lazy and backward) southerners were receiving all the money with the help 
of a rotten regime in Belgrade, which had already even declared the Serbs to be the 
leading force of the country. Croatian mainstream nationalism contains a superior 
self-understanding in relation to Serbs and other Balkan peoples.
Troubled masculinity is not the only societal potential for the strong development 
of a large group identity in Volkan’s sense, but it is clearly one of those vulnerabilities 
that can be reinterpreted by splitting and social prejudice, and it became also an 
automotive dynamics in accelerating the cruelty of the warfare.
CONCLUSION
My intention is not to ‘explain’ the dynamics of a cultural conflict through the 
masculinity issue. But it provides an interesting ‘window’ into the link between 
psychodynamic processes and societal circumstances. Masculinity seems to illustrate 
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the crossroads of a historical learning process and those temporary subjective 
processes of dealing with one’s own life that form the ground for politicization of 
subjectivity. The actual history was the activation of a particular psychodynamics 
in a specific historical situation. But had there not been a heritage of obsolete 
masculinity – out of phase with a modern, intercultural reality – that could be ignited 
as a power strategy, the crisis in Yugoslav society might have taken another turn. We 
can compare with e.g. Portugal, where the army with a hope for a democratic future 
overturned the dictatorship in 1974.
In the wider context of how to understand identity politics, it seems that Volkan’s 
theory of collective defence mechanisms and the dynamics of large group identification 
in combination with an analysis of contemporary societal conditions and people’s 
subjective handling of critical conditions may enable deeper understanding of a 
phenomenon which seems hardly understandable. The analysis that horrible identity 
politics have their background in changing gender relations and threatened masculinity 
insight into the psychosocietal processes whereby ideas and practices that used to be 
limited to very marginal groups under certain circumstances can become mainstream 
identifications. It is also related to much less spectacular forms of defence: families 
are divided, and public rhetoric and consciousness become explicitly revanchist. The 
politicization of subjectivity is in no way bound to be such a murderous regression; 
understanding its dynamic genesis is however the first condition for reflecting on and 
integrating feelings that might otherwise become destructive.
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